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The  high  food  prices  experienced  over  recent  years  have  led  to  the 
widespread view that food price volatility has increased. However, volatility 
has  generally  been  lower  over  the  two  most  recent  decades  than 
previously. Variability over the most recent period has been high but, with 
the important exception of rice, not out of line with historical experience. 
There is weak evidence that the volatility of grains and vegetable oils prices 
may  be  increasing  but  it  is  too  early  to  make  a  definite  statement. 
Important open issues remain with respect to biofuels, climate change and 
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World dollar prices of major agricultural food commodities (“food prices” in what follows) 
rose dramatically from late 2006 through to mid 2008. Prices collapsed dramatically in the 
second half of 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. This episode is often referred to as 
the “2008 price spike”.  Prices partially recovered in the second half of 2009 to levels which 
generally exceed pre-spike values. Figure 1 shows (nominal) monthly prices for major grains 
and oilseeds over the period 1990-2009. 
 
Figure 1: Grains price index numbers (2005 = 100), 1990-2009   
A number of authors have discussed the factors which lie behind the 2008 price spike – see 
Abbott et al (2008), Mitchell (2008), Cooke and Robles (2009) and Gilbert (2010a). A large 
number of potential explanations is available. Those given greatest prominence are 
·  rapid  economic  growth,  particularly  in  China  and  other  Asian  economies, 
emphasized by Gilbert (2010a).  
·  decades of underinvestment in agriculture – see World Bank (2007); 
·  low inventory levels; 
·  poor harvests, in particular in Australia; 2 
 
·  depreciation of the U.S. dollar, emphasized by Abbot et al (2008); 
·  diversion of food crops into the production of biofuels, emphasized by Abbot et 
al (2008) and Mitchell (2008);  
·  speculative  influences,  emphasized  by  Cooke  and  Robles  (2009)  and  Gilbert 
(2010a,b). 
We  do  not  join  this  debate.  Instead,  we  ask  whether  food  prices  have  become  more 
variable. Was the 2008 price spike a “one off” event without implications for the longer 
term or does it signal the initiation of a more volatile period in which price spikes of this sort 
will become more frequent occurrences? Previous periods of high volatility have prompted 
the same questions but the historical experience has generally been that periods of high 
volatility  have  been  relatively  short  and  interspaced  with  longer  periods  of  market 
tranquillity. It is would therefore be wrong simply to extrapolate recent and current high 
volatility  levels  into  the  future.  However,  it  remains  valid  to  ask  whether  part  of  the 
volatility rise may be permanent. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we define volatility and provide a brief 
discussion of volatility measurement. Section 3 looks at the facts of food price volatility over 
the past four decades and then specifically focuses on 2007-09. In section 4 we discuss 
determinants of food priced volatility and, based on this discussion, in section 5 we look 
ahead at possible changes in volatility over the foreseeable future. Section 6 is devoted to 
rice on the basis that it is both important and also different from other food commodities. 
Section 7 discusses policy towards volatility and section 8 offers conclusions and highlights 
open research issues. 
2.  Volatility – Definition, measurement and origin 
Volatility is a directionless measure of the extent of the variability of a price or quantity. It 
follows that volatility measures derive from the second moment of the distribution of the 
price or quantity in question, or transformations thereof. Economists generally focus on the 
standard deviation of logarithmic prices since this is a unit free measure. For low levels of 
volatility, the log standard deviation is approximately equal to the coefficient of variation. 3 
 
Economic  series  typically  exhibit  trends.  Any  measure  of  the  volatility  of  price  levels 
therefore requires the series to be detrended since otherwise trend movements will be 
included in the volatility measures. Because trends are rarely linear and deterministic (Kim 
et al, 2003; Kellard and Wohar, 2006), detrending requires a trend model which implies a 
judgemental trade-off between attribution of variability to the trend itself and to variation 
about the trend. The volatility measure can therefore depend on the choice of trend model 
in an undesirable manner. In looking at price volatility, economists often circumvent these 
issues by measuring volatility as the standard deviation of price returns, i.e. the standard 
deviation  of  changes  in  logarithmic  prices.  We  adopt  this  standard  measurement 
convention. 
It  is  conventional  to  quote  return  volatilities  at  an  annual  rate.  The  theory  of 
(informationally) efficient markets implies that asset price returns should be independent 
over time. This implies that monthly volatilities can be annualized by multiplying by  12  
and  daily  volatilities  annualized  by  multiplying  by  250   (there  are  approximately  250 
trading days in the year) (Taylor, 2008). Even though many markets depart to some extent 
from this definition of efficiency, it remains convenient to use these standard conversion 
factors. In what follows, we measure volatilities by the standard deviations of the changes in 
the logarithms of monthly price averages at an annualized rate. 
3.  Historical review 
Agricultural prices, and prices of commodities in general, were very volatile over 2006-08 
and continue to be volatile in 2009. It is this burst of volatility that has prompted interest in 
the likely course of volatility over the longer term. Previous periods of high volatility have 
prompted the same questions but the historical experience has generally been that periods 
of high volatility have been relatively short and interspaced with longer periods of market 
tranquillity. It is therefore recognized that it would be wrong simply to extrapolate recent 
and current high volatility levels into the future. However, it remains valid to ask whether 
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Notes: Standard deviations of logarithmic changes in monthly average real U.S. dollar prices 
at an annual rate, January 1970 - December 2009. Nominal prices are deflated by the US PPI 
(all items).  p-values in “[.]” parentheses. Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
except coffee (International Coffee Organization). 5 
 
Academic and policy analyses have tended to focus on price levels rather than volatilities. 
Gilbert (2006) showed that agricultural price volatility was low in the nineteen sixties but 
was higher in the nineteen seventies and the first half of the eighties. It generally fell back in 
the  second  half  of  the  nineteen  eighties  and  the  nineties  but  remained  well  above  its 
nineteen sixties level. Table 1 updates Table 4 of Gilbert (2006) looking from 1970 to 2009. 
The sample is divided at the end of 1989 which is the half-way point in the sample. The first 
column of the table reports the volatility estimate for the commodity over the entire forty 
year period. The second column gives the estimates for 1970-89 (above) and 1990-2009 
(below).  The  third  column  reports  the  standard  F  test  for  variance  equality.  The  test 
outcome is summarized in the final column. Figure 2 shows the same figures graphically 
with the commodities ordered by the extent to which volatility increased between the two 
periods. 
Fi
gure 2: Changes in volatility over time 
From the first column of Table 1, we see that agricultural volatilities have been lowest for 
grains and meats and highest for fresh fruit. Fruit is perishable and storage, which can limit 
volatility, plays a more limited role for fruits than for the other commodities considered in 6 
 
the table – see the discussion in section 4. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 1 show that there was a 
statistically significant rise in volatility for only two commodities – bananas and rice. By 
contrast, nine commodities saw statistically significant falls in volatility – cocoa, soybeans, 
sugar, three vegetable oils (soybean, groundnut and palm) and the three meat and fish 
products (beef, lamb and fishmeal). Overall, therefore the most recent two decades have 
seen  lower  levels  of  agricultural  volatility  than  in  those  of  the  nineteen  seventies  and 
eighties with rice constituting the main exception to this tendency.  
In splitting the sample at the end of the nineteen eighties, the tests reported in Table 1 
provide  a  relatively  crude  indication  of  whether  volatilities  have  been  changing.  It  is 
arguable that it is the high volatility levels of the most recent years that are out of line with 
past experience. This is difficult to judge because volatility itself is highly variable over time. 
Furthermore, periods of high volatility tend to bunch. One way of posing the question in 
relation to recent levels of volatility is to estimate a volatility model. 
The GARCH (Generalized AutoRegresive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) model is now the 
standard  procedure  for  modelling  volatility  in financial  markets  (Engle,  1992;  Bollerslev, 
1986). GARCH specifies an AutoRegressive Moving Average (ARMA) process for the variance 
(scedastic) process followed by a time series to yield an estimate of the conditional variance 
of  the  process  at  each  date  in  the  sample.  A  GARCH(1,1)  specification  usually  proves 
sufficient. This specifies the conditional variance ht of the price innovation et in month t as 
depending on its own lagged value ht-1 and the lagged squared price innovation  - e
2
1 t . In the 
case  that  m=0  and  a+b=1,  this  makes  the  conditional  variance  an  exponentially 
weighted moving average of past squared innovations. 



















Consistently with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, our specification sees the logarithmic 
price  change  as  following  a  first  order  moving  average  MA(1)  process  where  the 
dependence  arises  out  of  monthly  averaging  (Working,  1960).  Within  this  standard 
framework,  we  include  a  dummy  variable  Dt,  equal  to  unity  from  January  2007,  in  the 
conditional variance equation to see whether there was an upward shift in the mean of the 7 
 
scedastic process over the period 2007-09. The question may be paraphrased as asking 
whether the conditional volatility of food prices was higher from 2006 or whether we simply 
observed a number of high prices leaving expected volatility unchanged. Non-negativity of 
the conditional variances requires  , , 0 m a b³  and m >l  Stationarity requires a+b<1. 
Results are summarized in Table 2. Of the 19 commodities considered, 14 show positive 
estimates for the dummy coefficient λ, the remaining five (coffee, bananas, oranges, lamb 
and fishmeal) giving rise to negative estimates. However, only two of these coefficients 
differ significantly from zero at the 95% level – soybean oil (positively) and lamb (negatively) 
with groundnut oil very close to significant on the positive side. In many cases, the GARCH α 
and β coefficients are poorly determined or, in the absence of constraints, would violate the 
non-negativity constraints (maize, sorghum and bananas), undermining confidence in the 
model. Overall the results are consistent with some rise in volatility in the prices of grains 
and vegetable oil but fall a long way short of demonstrating such a rise. 
To summarize, this analysis has generated three conclusions: 
a)  Agricultural price volatility was generally lower over the past two decades than in the 
nineteen seventies and eighties, the major exception being rice. 
b)  Although many agricultural products exhibited high volatility over the three year periods 
2006-08, and this volatility persists to the present, these volatilities are generally in line 
within historical experience. 
c)  There is weak evidence that volatility levels may be increasing relative to historical levels 
across the grains and vegetable oils complex. However, we will need to wait for a few 
more years to know whether this is indeed the case. 
These  findings  are  in  line  with  those  of  another  recent  study  (Balcombe,  2009)  of 
agricultural price volatility, which used more sophisticated econometric methods but which 
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The table reports estimates of the GARCH(1,1) model on monthly average data over the period 
January 1990 – December 2009. The first order (mean) process is MA(1). The conditional variance 
equation is augmented by a dummy variable which takes the value one from January 2007. Robust t 
statistics are given in parentheses. An asterisk indicates a coefficient restricted to zero to satisfy the 
GARCH non-negativity constraints. The estimated values of μ and δ are not reported. 9 
 
 
4.  The causes of food price volatility 
Agricultural  prices  vary  because  production  and  consumption  are  variable.  Economists 
distinguish between predictable and unpredictable variability, the latter being characterized 
in terms of shocks. Shocks to production and consumption transmit into price variability. 
Production  can  vary  either  because  of  variations  in  area  planted  or  because  of  yield 
variations, typically due to weather. Consumption varies because of changes in incomes, 
changes in prices of substitutes and shifts in tastes. It is generally supposed that the most 
important source of price variability in agriculture is weather shocks to agricultural yields. 
Nevertheless, demand shocks, in particular income shocks (Gilbert, 2010a) and policy shocks 
(Christiensen, 2009) may also play an important role. 
The extent to which given production and consumption shocks translate into price volatility 
depends on supply and demand elasticities which, in turn, reflect the responsiveness of 
producers and consumers to changes in prices. It is generally agreed that these elasticities 
are low over the short term, in particular within the crop year. Farmers cannot harvest what 
they have not planted and will almost invariably harvest everything that they have planted. 
Consumers are reluctant to revise habitual dietary patterns and, in poor countries, they may 
have few alternatives. In richer countries, the commodity raw material may comprise only a 
small  component  of  many  processed  foods  with  the  consequence  that  even  large 
commodity price rises have a small impact on final product prices. 
Stockholding causes volatility to bunch. When stocks are low, relatively small production or 
consumption shocks can have large price impacts but when they are high, the reverse is the 
case.  Moreover, once stock levels become high, they will remain high until consumption has 
exceeded production for sufficient time to absorb past surpluses. Stockholding therefore 
results in a cyclical pattern in prices and volatilities even if supply and demand shocks are 
independent over time. World grain stocks fell to low levels by 2006 and this is seen as one 
cause of recent high grains price volatility. Since it takes time to rebuild stocks, it is possible 
that volatility levels will remain high over the next few years. But this does not imply that 
volatilities will be permanently higher.  10 
 
Other  factors  may  also  be  important  in  either  amplifying  or  attenuating  volatility. 
Stockholding will reduce volatility so long as stocks are accumulated in periods of excess 
supply and released in times of excess demand. However, stockholding is more effective in 
reducing the extent of price falls in the event of positive supply shocks (abundant harvests) 
than in reducing the extent of price rises in the event of shortfalls since destocking depends 
on  the  existence  of  a  carryover  from  previous  years.  Stockholding  therefore  reduces 
volatility and also gives a positive skew to the price distribution (Wright and Williams, 1991; 
Deaton and Laroque, 1992). 
Speculation is a second factor which may have either a positive or a negative impact on 
volatility. Speculation may either take the form of physical stockholding or purchase and 
sale of commodity futures or other derivative contracts. However, not all futures markets 
transactions are speculative - the standard regulatory distinction between hedging, in which 
supply  chain  agents  attempt  to  offset  risk  exposure  through  futures  transactions,  and 
speculation  is  that  speculators  are  “non-commercials”,  i.e.  they  do  not  have  any 
involvement  in  the  physical  commodity  trade.  Commodity  futures  markets  are  seen  as 
providing  a  structure  in  which  risk  is  transferred  from  commercial  to  non-commercial 
traders, i.e. from hedgers to speculators. In assuming this price risk, speculators provide the 
market  liquidity  which  enables  hedgers  to  find  counterparties  in  a  relatively  costless 
manner. 
By  analogy  with  insurance  markets,  in  aggregate,  speculators  will  expect  to  profit  and 
hedgers  to  pay  for  this  risk  transfer.  The  traditional  view  among  economists  is  that 
speculation  will  tend  to  be  stabilizing  (i.e.  volatility  reducing)  because  destabilizing 
speculation will be unprofitable and will therefore not persist (Friedman, 1953). However, 
much speculation is undertaken by trend-following Commodity Trade Advisors or amateur 
traders, and there is a worry that their extrapolatively-based actions may result in self-
fulfilling beliefs – if identified as a nascent trend, a randomly-induced price rise will generate 
further buying thereby reinforcing the initial movement (De Long et al, 1990; Irwin and 
Yoshimura,  1999;  Irwin  and  Holt,  2004;  Gilbert,  2010b).  Destabilizing  speculation  may 
remain profitable until the very last moment when prices crash back to (or beyond) their 
fundamental levels. 11 
 
More  recently,  a  significant  group  of  institutional  investors  have  started  to  invest  in 
commodity  futures  through  index-based  swap  transactions  as  a  portfolio  diversification 
strategy and to assume exposure to the commodity “asset class”. In agricultural futures 
markets, these positions are often large in relation to total activity - up to 40% of market 
open interest (Gilbert, 2010b). Differently from traditional speculation, these positions are 
relatively  long  term  and  are  predominantly  long,  i.e.  they  involve  purchase  of  futures 
contracts  which  are  then  held  as  long  term  investments.  The  sharp  rise  in  index-based 
investment  in  commodity  futures  over  the  past  five  years  may  therefore  be  seen  as  a 
positive shock to inventory demand. Gilbert (2010a) argues that this shock was a significant 
contributory  factor  to  the  2007-08  food  price  spike.  See  also  U.S.  Senate  Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (2009). 
Food price volatility therefore arises from shocks which can come from a number of sources, 
with  the  impact  being  felt  differently  in  each  separate  commodity  market.  On  some 
occasions, these shocks will be correlated. Often this will be the case if common factors 
simultaneously  affect  a  range  of  different  markets,  perhaps  including  non-agricultural 
markets. This appears to have been the case in 2007-08 when most agricultural prices and 
many non-agricultural prices (energy, metals and freight rates) rose simultaneously. It was 
also the case in the 1973-74 food price spike. In such cases, it appears likely that there are 
common causal factors. There is less agreement in the identity of these causal factors but 
demand  growth,  high  oil  prices  perhaps  generating  demand  for  grains  as  biofuels 
feedstocks, dollar depreciation and futures market speculation are all candidates in this 
regard  (Cooper  and  Lawrence,  1975;  Baffes,  2007;  Abbott  et  al.,  2008;  Mitchell,  2008; 
Gilbert, 2010a). 
5.  How might food price volatility change in the future? 
The current concern is that food price volatility may have increased over recent years and 
may  increase  further  in  the  future.  It  follows  from  the  discussion  in  section  4  that  an 
increase in price volatility must arise from one or more of the following four factors: 
a)  an increase in the variance of demand shocks; 
b)  an increase in the variance of supply shocks; 12 
 
c)  a decline in the elasticity of demand; 
d)  a decline in the elasticity of supply. 
In section 1, we listed a number of factors seen as contributory to food price developments 
over 2006-08.  In asking whether these factors have had a long term effect on volatility 
levels, or whether instead their impact is transient, it is useful to relate the factors to the 
four categories listed above. 
a)  Increased demand variability: 
Gilbert (2010a) emphasizes the role of demand factors in the determination of food prices 
and  a  number  of  commentators  have  pointed  to  rapid  economic  growth  in  China  and 
elsewhere in Asia as the common driver of commodity price changes in energy and metals 
as well as for foods. If demand growth is becoming more variable as it becomes faster, this 
will  also  generate  increased  food  price  volatility.  At  the  time  of  writing,  the  global 
macroeconomic outlook  is  highly uncertain  and  combines  continuing fast  growth  in  the 
emerging economies with a stagnant prospect in the developed economies. If the eventual 
resolution  of  current  global  imbalances  involves  further  crises,  these  are  likely  to  be 
reflected in greater food price volatility. 
The use of food crops as biofuels feedstocks also fits under the demand variability heading. 
Many commentators have claimed that the demand for food commodities, in particular 
corn, sugar and vegetable oils, as biofuel feedstocks has increased the correlation between 
agricultural  prices  and  the  oil  price  –  see,  in  particular,  Mitchell  (2008).  This  allows 
transmission of oil price volatility to agricultural prices, in effect increasing the variance of 
demand shocks. If one concedes that oil price volatility has increased over time, this could 
lead to increased food price volatility. There has been no systematic study of the effect of 
biofuels  demand  on  food  price  volatility,  as  distinct  from  on  the  level  of  food  prices. 
Scientific studies of the effects of biofuels demand on food price levels fail to find clear 
evidence of an increased linkage between the oil price and agricultural prices over recent 
years – see Gilbert (2010a). This may be because biofuels production in Europe and the 
United States has to date been driven more by government mandate requirements than by 13 
 
direct profit considerations and has therefore not been sensitive to changes in the oil price. 
This may change as China becomes a major producer of biofuels. 
Index-based  investment  in  commodity  futures,  discussed  in  section  4  in  relation  to 
speculation, also relates to the demand variability heading. Index investors purchase long 
positions  in  commodity  futures,  generally  via  swap  transactions,  and  hold  these  for 
extended periods of time. This may be regarded as a form of “virtual storage” in which the 
investors pay the market to carry inventory on their behalf. The result is to add an additional 
component  to  the  demand  equation  and  hence  also  an  additional  source  of  demand 
variability  with  the  implication  that  financial  market  shocks  can  be  imported  into  food 
markets. Many commercial traders argue that this is precisely what has happened over 
recent years with the consequence that price movements have sometimes been divorced 
from underlying developments in physical supply and demand. Gilbert (2010a,b) confirms 
the importance of index-based futures investment in amplifying price movements in 2008 
but  notes  that  these  effects  were  smaller  in  food  markets  than  in  energy  and  metals 
markets reflecting the lower involvement of index-based investors in agricultural futures. 
b)  Increased supply variability: 
Poor Australian wheat harvests in 2006 and 2007 and a poor European 2007 harvest have 
been mentioned as possible causes of the 2006-08 food price spike. However, these poor 
harvests  were  offset  by  good  harvests  elsewhere  in  the  world,  notably  Argentina, 
Kazakhstan and Russia, and 2008 harvests were generally good. Mitchell (2008) discounts 
poor harvests as a major cause of the spike.  
Looking  to  the  future,  there  must  be  a  concern  that  global  warming  will  increase  the 
variance of agricultural production. Theoretical models, e.g. Schlenker et al (2005) and FAO 
(2008),  suggest  damage  to  existing  cropping  areas  if  temperatures  rise.  It  is  certainly 
possible to find clear examples of specific crop-country combinations where this is the case. 
These mainly relate to production in relatively arid areas – grain production in much of 
Australia, cattle in areas of Africa bordering the Sahara and food production in south Asia 
and southern Africa (World Bank, 2009). It is widely believed that global warming may result 
in more extreme weather conditions and this may result in greater yield variability. We are 14 
 
not aware of scientific discussion of this possibility. In any case, there remains the question 
of  the  extent  to  which  increased  yield  variability  in  specific  crops  and  countries  will 
generalize to the entire spectrum of food prices. 
c)  Lower demand elasticities: 
Demand can only respond to price developments if food consumers face prices which are 
related to world markets. This forces attention on the issue of food price transmission, i.e. 
the  extent  to  which  prices  on  world  markets  are  passed  through  to  local  prices  –  see 
Mundlak and Larsen (1992). Price transmission is generally high in developed countries but, 
because the food commodity itself often only accounts for a small share of the total value of 
the product – transportation and marketing dominate – even quite large changes in world 
prices only have small effects on retail prices. Transmission is more variable in developing 
countries and is often hindered by high transportation costs which can divorce local prices 
from those on world markets – see Conforti (2004). Over time, greater market integration 
(“globalization”)  is  tending  to  diminish  these  barriers.  On  the  other  hand,  governments 
often respond to higher food prices by raising subsidies. Irrespective of the wisdom of such 
policies, they will diminish price responsiveness on the part of consumers. This has been 
cited as a contributory factor for oil price volatility but has not generally been regarded as 
important for food crops. 
The traditional view of speculation as price stabilizing, discussed in section 4, may also be 
seen as affecting demand elasticities. By buying low and selling high, profitable speculation 
should reduce price variability. They will do this more effectively as markets become more 
liquid. There are three qualifications to these arguments. First, the evidence is mixed that 
speculation  is  generally  profitable  (Edwards  and  Ma,  1992,  472-476).  Second,  not  all 
speculation  corresponds  to  this  traditional  view  –  see  the  discussion  of  index-based 
investment  in  (a)  above.  Third,  even  if  speculation  does  reduce  variances  at  lower 
frequencies (e.g. month to month variability), it also appears to increase higher frequency 
variances (day-to-day and intraday variability). The overall effects of futures speculation are 
therefore more mixed than those predicted by the simple traditional account. 
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d)  Lower supply elasticities: 
Grain inventories have fallen over the period since the millennium and this has been cited as 
a contributory factor in the 2006-08 price spike. That argument is difficult to sustain in a 
simple form since the decline in inventory levels was slow and steady while the price rise, in 
2007 and the first half of 2008, was sharp and sudden. What is clearer is that low inventory 
levels will have reduced the responsiveness of supply the demand shocks seen above as 
important in generating the price rises. Demand and supply shocks are responsible for the 
incidence of price changes while the level of inventories determines the amplitude of the 
resulting price movements.   
Grain reserves have fallen to low levels for two reasons. First, commercial users have sought 
to economize on inventory and have placed reliance on rapid and flexible delivery. Second, 
governments  have  come  to  rely  more  on  trade  than  food  security  inventories  to  meet 
shortfalls in domestic availability. Both developments have been driven by the awareness 
that inventories are expensive to maintain. Commercial reliance on suppliers and national 
reliance on trade provide lower cost solutions to availability problems so long as shocks are 
idiosyncratic.  They  will  fail  when  shocks  are  common.  This  was  brought  home  to 
governments in 2008 who found that reliance on trade for food security objectives is likely 
to fail in exactly those circumstances in which it is required. The result is a move back to 
inventories both in the commercial supply chain and at the governmental level in relation to 
food security. Higher grain inventory levels should ensure that future supply and demand 
shocks are more easily absorbed.  
Underinvestment in agriculture, cited in World Bank (2007) and particularly acute in the 
developing world, by contrast, cannot be addressed so rapidly. It takes the form of poor 
agricultural infrastructure (roads, warehousing, port facilities), under-developed rural credit 
and exhaustion of soil nutrients, often as the result of poor farming practice and lack of 
research into new seed varieties – see Thurow and Kilman (2009). All of these factors limit 
the ability of developing country farmers to respond to price incentives and this exacerbates 
price volatility. 16 
 
There  is  a  final factor, exchange  rate  variability,  which  does  not  fit  easily  into  the  four 
categories set out above. Changes in exchange rates reallocate purchasing power and price 
incentives  across  countries  without  changing  the  overall  food  supply-demand  balance. 
Dollar  depreciation  raises  prices  to  U.S.  producers  and  consumers  but  lowers  prices  to 
consumers outside the dollar area. This is because the dollar price of the commodity on 
world markets will rise as the result of the depreciation but by less than the extent of the 
depreciation implying a fall in, say, euro prices – see Ridler and Yandle (1972). Exchange rate 
variability therefore contributes to the variability of prices measured in dollar terms, but 
would  vanish  if  prices  were  measured  in  terms  of  an  appropriately  weighted  basket  of 
currencies. 
The overall scorecard is therefore mixed. Table 3 attempts a highly judgmental summary of 
the impact of the various factors considered both on the incidence and amplitude of the 
2006-08 price shock and on likely important future price volatility: 
Table 3 
Qualitative importance of different factors 
  2006-08 impact  Likely future impact 
The international macroeconomic environment  positive  uncertain 
Demand for food crops as biofuel feedstocks  positive but small  positive 
Futures market speculation   positive  positive 
Climate change  minimal  uncertain 
Price transmission  minimal  small 
Inventory levels  positive  small 
Underinvestment in agriculture  positive but small  positive 
Exchange rate variability  positive  small 
 
6.  Rice 
Rice, which is the staple food in much of Asia and is also widely imported and consumed in 
central  and  west  Africa  and  in  the  Caribbean,  is  an  exception  to  many  of  the  general 
conclusions drawn above in relation to food price volatility.  
·  Rice is not closely linked in terms of either production or consumption with other 
major  grains  –  it  is  produced  on  different  types  of  land  and  largely  in  different 
countries, and, in the main, is consumed by different groups of consumers.  17 
 
·  Rice production and consumptions shocks are not highly correlated with those in 
other grains.  
·  Rice is not currently traded on a liquid futures market – futures markets exist in both 
Bangkok and Chicago but they attract relatively little business.  
The consequence of these differences is that there is little transmission of price changes 
from  other  grains  to  rice,  or  vice  versa.  Rice  prices  therefore  tend  to  follow  their  own 
peculiar  path.  Financial  activity  on  futures  markets  has  little  impact.  Nevertheless,  rice 
prices did rise strongly in 2007-08 and remain high in 2009.  
The rice story in 2007-09 is peculiar and in some sense pre-modern – see Christiaensen 
(2008) and Timmer (2009a). Rice differs from other food commodities in that only a small 
proportion of world rice enters into international trade (most major consumers are also 
major producers) and that much rice which is traded is bought or sold at contracted and not 
free market prices. The free market is therefore residual and has the potential to exhibit 
high  volatility.  There  were  no  significant  production  or  consumption  shocks  in  the  rice 
market which was in surplus through the whole of 2007-08. The initial price rise came in 
October 2007 when the Indian government limited rice exports in order to offset the effects 
of rising wheat prices of the cost of living index. Fears that this might lead to a shortfall led 
to panic buying by governments of poor rice-importing countries which drove prices up to 
unprecedented levels. Prices fell back in July 2008 when that Japanese government agreed 
to sell rice from its WTO stockpile. In the end, no rice was sold but the offer was sufficient to 
cool the market.  
The international rice market is evidently highly problematic as well as politically important - 
most of the so-called food riots in 2007-08 involved rice. It is urgent and important that 
steps are taken to avoid repeat of this episode – see Timmer (2009b). In our view, however, 
it would be an error to see the problems affecting the rice market as generalizing to other 
grains markets or to wider agricultural markets. Both the sequence of events over 2007-09 
and the volatility statistics section 2 underline that “rice is different”. Whether or not rice 
price volatility increases or declines over the coming years will depend on how well the 18 
 
international  community  addresses  the  particular  problems  of  that  market,  not  on  any 
general tendency of volatility in general to increase or decline. 
7.  Mechanisms to reduce food price volatility 
There have been many attempts to deal with the problems associated with price volatility. 
These can be reviewed in terms of the time period of interest. Taking the short term first, 
this refers to an instant and short-run response to increased volatility often in conjunction 
with rising price levels. Many developing and middle income countries have sought to deal 
with  significant  price  volatility  either  through  export  controls  (as  in  south-east  Asia  in 
relation to rice) or through price subsidies. The result is that shocks on the world market are 
only partially transmitted to domestic consumers. By insulating domestic producers and 
consumers from what is often seen as “imported volatility”, countries reduce demand and 
supply elasticities in the world market. When a significant number of major producers of the 
commodity act in this way, prices on the residual world market become highly volatile.  
The interesting aspect of these short term measures is that while domestic markets might 
experience a degree of greater stability as a result of intervention, the impact on the world 
market and more open countries is that volatility increases. Such beggar your neighbour 
policies often arise when world markets are in decline or in periods of great instability. This 
was the situation in the rice market in 2007-08 and characterized the world sugar market 
through much of the nineteen seventies and eighties. In these cases, we need to balance 
the advantage of reduced volatility in the protected markets against the costs of increased 
volatility for countries dependent on the residual free market.  
Longer term policies and responses are more systematic and expansive in what they try to 
achieve.  At  the  aggregate  level,  economies  have  sought  to  work  collectively  to  limit 
fluctuations  in  world  prices  of  commodities,  an  approach  manifest  in  the  international 
commodity agreements that dominated the 1960s and 1970s for a range of commodities 
including  sugar,  coffee and  cocoa.  Control  in  these  markets  came  via  a  combination  of 
buffer stocks (cocoa) and quota limitation of exports (coffee and sugar) with the aim of 
maintaining prices within target bands that were agreed between consumer and producer 
nations. The historical experience indicates that export controls are politically difficult and 19 
 
cannot easily accommodate the arrival of new producers while buffer stock agreements are 
costly and vulnerable to speculative attack. Gilbert (1996) argued that the cocoa and sugar 
agreements achieved little success in their objectives, in the case of cocoa because of lack of 
adequate financing and in that of sugar because of political problems in relation to the 
Cuban export quota. The coffee agreement did however both raise and stabilize prices and 
the ending of controls in 1989 resulted in both lower prices and greater volatility. 
Coffee market controls lapsed because of a diminished enthusiasm for their enforcement. 
As the largest coffee consuming country, the United States saw less interest in supporting 
the export revenues of its Latin American allies in the post Cold War period. Brazil, which 
remains the largest coffee consuming country, had seen its market share eroded by higher 
cost African producers as the result of export restrictions and, having grown to become the 
second most important coffee consuming country, had come to have mixed views on the 
benefits of high prices (Gilbert, 1996). Arguably, if controls had been maintained in 1989, 
the agreement would have been unable to accommodate the arrival of Vietnam as a major 
new exporter in the 1990s since this would have required existing exporters to cede export 
quotas.  With  the  lapse  of  controls,  Vietnamese  exports  displaced  higher  cost  African 
production allowing Brazil to gain back lost market share despite the arrival of Vietnam as a 
major new exporter. 
There have been calls for a return to a more regulated food trade environment through 
supply management, as in the coffee agreement, as a means of combating some of the 
effects of world price instability. It is hard, however, to envisage that the current world 
order would countenance such a move, particularly in a trading environment dominated by 
multinational trade negotiations designed to create freer trading conditions and which seek 
to open up markets rather than close them down.  
Buffer  stock  intervention  raises  different  issues.  There  is  a  widespread  view,  discussed 
above in section 4, that low levels of grain stocks may have exacerbated food price volatility 
over 2006-08. If governments take the view that private sector is unwilling or unable to hold 
adequate stocks they may wish to augment these through public stocks. These could be 
held  either  nationally  or  through  an  international  authority.  This  policy  direction  is 
dangerous.  First,  public  stockholding  discourages  and  crowds  out  private  stockholding 20 
 
(Miranda and Helmberger, 1988) as the private sector comes to rely on the availability of 
subsidized public inventory. The second problem is that any commitment to maintain prices 
within pre-announced bands, as in the cocoa agreement, makes the stockholding authority 
vulnerable to speculative attack (Salant, 1983). There is a case for public stockholding of 
food commodities in landlocked developing countries which are largely isolated from world 
markets and where the private sector is poorly represented. This case is much weaker for 
developed countries and in relation to the world market where it would be preferable to 
provide  improved  incentives  for  private  stockholding.  A  possible  mechanism  is  for  an 
international agency to purchase grain futures contracts in periods of excess supply such as 
to induce, and have access to, larger inventories in subsequent years. 
Alternative measures for stabilisation of price came in ex post policies such as the EU’s 
STABEX scheme that focused less on prices per se but instead on the impact volatility had on 
a  country’s  current  account  balance.  Under  STABEX,  payments  were  made  to  those 
countries which experienced large current account swings due to increasing import bills or 
indeed a collapse in export earnings due to price declines. However, such schemes were 
often viewed as insensitive to specific country concerns and were quite slow to respond to 
crises with the consequence that their impact was probably to amplify rather than damp the 
effects of price cycles. The successor FLEX scheme is generally seen as ineffective. Despite 
the fact that it sought to improve on the STABEX scheme, it still appears to contain some of 
the constraints and rigidities embodied in its predecessor. As Aiello (2009) suggests, the 
FLEX scheme has been dogged by a lack of finance to support its operation and also delays 
in getting funding out to those countries who meet eligibility criteria.  
In richer nations, agricultural policies have been established often with an explicit target of 
price volatility reduction, as seen in the original rationale for the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). While ostensibly more about raising farm incomes, as also was the case in US 
policy, the CAP did initially attempt to manage prices for both producers and consumers 
through elements of supply control. Thus quotas in sugar and milk, and trade restrictions 
(import  tariffs  and  export  subsidies)  sought  to  balance  consumption  and  production  at 
“reasonable” prices. Much of the policy intervention in recent years (e.g. the reforms under 
the  MacSharry  plans  of  1992)  had  been  designed  to  curb  the  growing  subsidisation  of 
exports onto world markets as EU production outstripped EU consumption and as the EU 21 
 
came under increasing pressure to negotiate a settlement in the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT. Thus, input controls such as set aside and variable levies were phased out to meet 
this requirement although the recent WTO ruling on sugar has led to a reduction in the use 
of export subsidies in that crop too which, when coupled with the more generic liberalising 
of EU policy has led to la more limited ability of the EU to isolate its internal market from 
the global market.  
Instead, greater attention is being paid to market-based measures of price risk management 
(Morgan, 2001). Insurance markets are well developed in most rich nations and offer some 
cover for crop failure but not for price risk. Futures and options markets instead provide a 
means to hedge price risk that is far cheaper than the alternative use of forward contracts 
and major exchanges in the US, Britain and increasingly India and China offer contracts in a 
range of major commodities such as grains, soybeans and other soft commodities like sugar, 
coffee and cocoa. However, direct uptake by producers can be limited (Pannel, 2007) even 
when communication is good, awareness of opportunities is high and the advantages would 
appear strong. At the same time, producers benefit indirectly from the greater pricing that 
futures-based risk management offers to intermediaries such as grain elevator companies.  
In cases where producers do not have such conditions – in poorer nations- use of futures 
and options markets becomes much more difficult. A World Bank-sponsored project (ITF, 
2000)  sought  to  explore  ways  to  design  intermediation  between  producer  nations  and 
major commodity exchanges so that the benefits of hedging could be opened to all. Dana 
and Gilbert (2008) review this experience and argue that the major impact is likely to be 
seen through the protection of supply chain intermediaries than directly through take-up by 
the producers themselves. 
The 2007-08 food price spike has reawakened interest in food security issues. Governments, 
whether or not democratic, have found that they cannot afford to leave these issues to the 
operation of  the  market.  Indeed,  the  perception  on  the  part  of  the  private  sector that 
governments  are unable  to  commit  to  staying  outside  food  issues  makes  it  difficult for 
private traders to ensure adequate supply until government has declared its own hand. In 
many  developing  countries,  the  private  sector  makes  insufficient  preparation  for  food 
supply problems knowing that governments will, in the end act. Then, when governments 22 
 
do intervene, they justify the necessity of doing so on the basis of the inadequate actions of 
the private sector. The question is therefore not whether governments should ensure food 
security, but how they should do so and how they should involve the private sector. 
Over  the  past  two  decades,  western  governments  and  multilateral  agencies  have 
emphasized  trade  over  national  food  reserves.  Food  reserves  were  seen  as  expensive, 
inflexible  and  prone  to  generate  corruption.  To  the  extent  that  supply  shocks  are 
uncorrelated across countries, it is less costly to import to meet a domestic shortfall. This 
advice worked well until 2007 when agricultural prices rose across the board. However, in 
2007-08, exactly when many countries needed to import additional food, they found prices 
rising against them or, in the extreme case of rice, markets being closed with the result that 
supplies were not available at any price. Governments have drawn the conclusion that the 
advice to rely on trade was incorrect and are now attempting to re-establish food security 
stocks. 
Concerns have been raised about the extent of speculation and there have been calls for 
tougher  regulation  to  ensure  supposedly  destabilising  speculative  activity  is  controlled. 
Index-based speculation in commodity futures was highlighted in section 5 as a contributory 
factor in recent food price volatility that may have exacerbated the 2006-08 food price 
spike.  
·  Speculation could be limited by increasing the “margin” required from speculators 
thereby increasing their costs. However, this would also limit market liquidity making 
it more costly for commercial traders to hedge their risk positions. 
·  Most exchanges already take steps to limit large positions which may have price-
distorting impact. These measures are commendable but tackle price manipulation 
more than volatility. 
·  von  Braun  and  Torrero  (2009)  have  proposed  a  “virtual  reserve”  system.  They 
suggest  that,  in  the  event  that  speculation  drives  grains  futures  prices  up  to 
excessive levels, the agency could intervene by selling grain futures – see also von 
Braun et al (2009). The mere knowledge of this possibility may be sufficient to limit 
speculative activity. However, lacking the benefits of hindsight, it is very difficult to 23 
 
know  whether  a  particular  price  level  is  excessive.  There  is  a  clear  danger  that, 
instead  of  discouraging  speculation,  misjudged  interventions  may  result  in  the 
transfer of taxpayers’ funds to speculators. 
·  The most straightforward, and least costly, means of limiting speculation is through 
encouraging  greater  transparency  in  relation  to  the  market  situation  and,  in 
particular,  to  stock  levels.  A  number  of  agencies,  in  particular  the  Food  and 
Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations  (the  FAO)  and  the  International 
Grains Council, already contribute in this regard but they are constrained by the 
information provided to them by national governments. The developed countries of 
Europe and North America generally provide comprehensive information but this is 
not the case for all developing countries, in particular China, which are now major 
food producers and consumers.   
Governments rightly value stability in the prices of basic food commodities. The correct 
balance  of  policy  will  vary  from  commodity  to  commodity.  Many  Asian  rice-producing 
countries  have  long  histories  of  successful  stabilization  of  domestic  rice  prices  using  a 
combination of import and/or export levies and food reserve stockpiles – see Dawe (2007) 
and  Timmer  (2009b).  However,  it  seems  unlikely  that  this  experience  can  easily  be 
generalized to the maize and wheat markets where there is greater geographical separation 
of production and consumption. Furthermore, as we have already noted in discussing the 
rice  price  spike,  successful  domestic  price  stabilization  can  often  be  at  the  expense  of 
greater volatility in world rice prices, effectively pushing the costs of any shortfall on many 
of the world’s poorest consumers. 
8.  Conclusions 
There  is  general  tendency  for  commentators  to  assert  that  food  price  volatility  has 
increased over time – on the contrary, the reverse appears to be true. Volatility has jumped 
over the most recent years but there have also been periods of high volatility in the past and 
the  recent  episode  does  not  appear  exceptional.  It  is  therefore  possible  to  hope  that 
volatility levels will drop back to historical levels over the coming years although it is too 
soon to be confident that this will be the outcome. 24 
 
Despite this, there are reasons – global warming, oil price volatility transmitted via biofuels 
demand,  index  investment  in  futures  markets  –  which  may  have  led  to  a  permanent 
increase in volatility in particular in grains prices. We cannot rule this possibility out, but we 
see little evidence that substantiates these claims which we therefore regard as (perhaps 
reasonable) conjecture and not fact. It is unhelpful, but nevertheless correct, to say that we 
need to wait for several more years before firm conclusions will be possible. 
This review has emphasized the exceptionality of rice. Recent rice price volatility has been 
much greater than historical experience would have suggested as likely. To a considerable 
extent, perceptions of the recent food price spike were driven by the difficulties experience 
in  the  rice  market,  and  the  dramatic  price  increases  that  these  engendered.  Rice  was, 
however not typical of other markets and the rice experience does not generalize. Low 
income rice-importing countries do urgently need to address their food security problems 
but  the  solutions  to  those  problems  will  not  necessarily  be  relevant  to  other  food 
commodity markets. 
There are three areas in which it would be helpful to have more research.  
a)  Most discussion of climate change in relation to food markets has rightly focussed on 
possible  impacts  on  yields.  There  has  been  very  little  discussion  of  the  possible 
impact on yield variability. 
b)  We have argued that the biofuels literature has not shown clear links from biofuels 
production to food prices and from oil price-induced variations in the profitability of 
biofuels to food price volatility. 
c)  We  have  highlighted  the  extensive  evidence  demonstrating  interconnection  of 
financial  and  food  commodity  markets  as  the  result  of  speculative  activity. 
Nevertheless this contention remains controversial and, until the mechanisms are 
better understood, the policy debate will remain confused. 25 
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